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WHAT ROLE FOR DOD INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION?
It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties which make the defense of our nation worthwhile.
Earl Warren, Jurist
Since the events of September 11, 2001 , much has been discussed and written about the 9/11 Commission report on homeland security and how to best use the capabilities of the intelligence community to better protect the homeland. President Bush has made homeland security a major tenet of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has done the same with the National Military Strategy (NMS).
Homeland security and the war on terrorism are linked. One of the ways that security of the nation is maintained is through collection of information or intelligence domestically, which risks infringing on the rights of United States citizens.
As President Bush noted in the National Security Strategy, "intelligence . . . is our first line of defense against terrorists" 1 The National Strategy on Homeland Security articulated the challenge that information regarding homeland security had not always been shared due to "real and perceived legal and cultural barriers." 5 If "the most serious weakness in agency capabilities were in the domestic arena," 6 then when "creating new organizations, distributing resources, and granting new powers-we may end up creating an intelligence state very different from the United States we have had during peacetime for more than two centuries." 7 In addition to Posse Comitatus, a consideration for DoD will be its limitations on collection of information domestically in order to protect the individual rights of U.S. persons. 8 What should be the proper role for DoD intelligence in support of homeland security, then given? Should current legal restrictions be modified-and are we operating now outside these bounds?
LIMITS ON DOD AND THEIR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Department of Defense and other federal agencies are limited by Executive Order (EO) 12333 respective to what information can be collected on U.S. persons, and by whom.
These rules seek to balance the individual rights versus the needs for domestic security.
Provisions in EO 12333 establish prohibitions and lay out responsibilities within the United
States for collection of information on U.S. persons. Derived from EO 12333, DoD further promulgated its guidance with 1981 in DoD 5240-1.R. This regulation provides limitations on the collection of information on U.S. persons within the United States and on citizens outside the country that will be used for intelligence purposes. 9 It lays out procedures under which DoD components can collect, provides guidance on certain collection techniques, and governs other aspects of DoD intelligence activities to include oversight of intelligence activities. 10 Although much interest was generated after September 11, 2001 on the procedure prohibiting assassination, the larger focus of the regulation-that of collection of information on U.S.
persons-appears to be largely taken for granted, despite the impact it may have on how DoD can collect or integrate foreign and domestic information in support of both the Homeland Defense and Homeland Security mission.
The constraints of EO 12333 resulted from the perception in the mid-1970s that the balance between individual rights versus domestic security had skewed too far against those individual rights upon which this nation is based. One of the ways that national security is maintained is through collection of information or intelligence domestically, which risks infringing on the rights of United States persons. The challenge is how to conduct domestic intelligence in such a manner as to balance the collection of information on U.S. citizens and the security of the nation, while "remaining consistent with the values of a democratic society." 11 Liberty, or freedom, and security are opposing conditions in which complete freedom creates anarchy in society while complete security results in a dictatorship. 12 A balance between the two must be reached.
The Constitution provides and establishes in law a system of government that defends the security of the people while also providing the guarantee of liberty. 13 The balance between security and liberty through American history has reflected the tension between these competing goals. Underscoring this balance is the "question of whether these means reinforce or betray the democratic identity they are supposed to defend." 14 As a democracy, the U.S. government must be concerned with both "the security of the majority and the rights of the The national need for balance between liberty and security resulted in the establishment of an institutionalized separation between domestic and foreign intelligence. 18 Initially codified in the National Security Act, it was further refined in Executive Orders written in response to intelligence community involvement in domestic intelligence during the 1960s, beyond the scope believed to be allowed by the National Security Act. 19 The National Security Act of 1947 codified the roles and responsibilities of the intelligence community, most clearly stating that the FBI had the internal security function, not the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
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In the mid 1970s, journalists and legislators discovered that intelligence agencies were collecting information on U.S. citizens on the authority of the executive branch and "caught up in an anti-Communist tide that swept aside safeguards against the misuse of power." 21 Up to this time, intelligence agencies were given broad discretionary powers with little supervision under the assumption they would be directing their focus outside of the United States towards foreign threats. 22 A Senate investigative committee under Senator Frank Church was charged to look into the allegations and was surprised to discover that the FBI had files on more than one million Americans (and 500,000 investigations without one single court conviction and had harassed individuals involved in both the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements); the NSA had monitored every cable sent to or received from overseas by Americans from 1947 to 1975; the CIA had opened mail and generated 1.5 million names for its own database in addition to infiltrating religious, media and academic organizations inside the United States; and the U.S.
Army had conducted investigations on 100,000 U.S. citizens. 23 The committee's determination that the FBI had sought authority "to act against a group or individual before a crime was committed" 24 was a break from democratic values, as it indicated a shift towards investigating expression of ideas rather than violations of law. Clearly, the balance had swung against the rights of individual rights in the United States.
The Church Committee further discovered at the root of the issue was the belief by the executive branch that dissidents were acting under the influence of a foreign government, the Soviet Union, and that "as a result, the United States would have to move outside the framework of the Constitution and the law; the legal system had become too confining in the struggle against the Soviet Union." 25 The distinction between domestic and foreign collection of information was breached and, moreover, shook the underpinning belief that the federal government upheld the democratic value of liberty espoused by the Constitution. The intelligence agencies and the executive branch had, unbeknownst to the public or to the legislative sector and based on their belief in a great threat, swung the balance to security. Again came the reinforcement for agencies to "ensure that information is gathered by the least intrusive means possible, and limit use of such information to lawful government activities." 30 The enactment of EO 12333 in 1982 by President Reagan, under which DoD 5240-1R serves, gives balance to both the need for individual rights and security. It does so by issuing a blanket statement that collection would be done "consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was founded" 31 In the United States, the FBI attempts to do both law enforcement and intelligence, even while other federal agencies, to include DoD, also conduct counterterrorism domestically within their jurisdictions. These democratic countries models do provide a methodology to examine as the U.S. crafts its next steps in domestic intelligence, even though U.S. guidelines for domestic intelligence gathering also impose "a far more restrictive definition of permissible areas of domestic intelligence gathering" 39 than those of foreign nations. Of note, however, is that these foreign nations have enacted a state system rather than one that relies on the military.
POST 9/11-A GROWING REALIZATION OF NEW REALITY
The attacks of 11 September 2001 brought the emphasis on security of the homeland into sharp focus. As stated in the 2002 National Security Strategy, "Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government." 40 The 9/11 commission echoed a call of the Hart-Rudman report that organization changes were necessary to ensure the security of the American homeland, specifically to better use the full capabilities of the U.S. homeland security (intelligence) community. 41 The attacks revealed gaps in threat identification based on definitional boundaries that hampered proper collection of intelligence information in the domestic sphere. First, the perception of the homeland security threat shifted from one strongly focused externally to a one that could be based domestically that could involve collection of information on U.S. citizens. Federal agencies that had restricted themselves from collecting U.S. person information needed to determine how to best incorporate all domestic and foreign information for a complete intelligence picture. Second, the amorphous boundary between homeland defense and homeland security blurs lead proponency for DoD and affects what DoD can collect and retain regarding intelligence for these two spheres. Third, because the boundary between critical DoD infrastructure and critical homeland infrastructure can be blurred, the information DoD can collect to protect these assets increases the need for domestic authority.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks controversy arose when it was learned that government agencies did not collect aggressively collect information because an EO, The FBI moved away from domestic intelligence investigations in the 1980s and 1990s, despite being the lead agency for foreign terrorist investigations within the United States. 44 As noted, the NSA assumed the FBI had lead of such items, and chose not to take proactive leads on any domestic intelligence. 45 Specifically in the case of the 9/11 attacks, the National Security Agency (NSA) did not collect information on communications with suspected terrorist facilities because it "did not want to be viewed as targeting persons in the United States." 46 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) failed to aggressively investigate one of the alleged 9/11 hijackers because of a requirement that "there must be 'probable cause' that he has actually committed, or is conspiring to commit, a terrorist act." 47 More than just information sharing then, was the need to understand what exactly were the boundaries for domestic intelligence collection and how to best use assets to support or tipoff agencies with the proper authority. To meet the National Security Strategy for Homeland Security's strategic objective to "prevent terrorist attacks within the United States,"7 from the domestic sphere must be integrated with foreign intelligence. The challenge is "to find a way of pooling intelligence and using it to guide the planning of and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations involving organizations as disparate as the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the military and the agencies involved in homeland security." 49 The boundary between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense further creates ambiguity for the DoD intelligence role. The integration of foreign and domestic information and intelligence to bridge any gaps in seams on potential threats spans the concepts of homeland security and homeland defense. Homeland defense is "the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression" 50 while homeland security is defined as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S., reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur." through DoD to DHS. 56 But the EO also clearly delineates that the DoD intelligence community can pass collected information to appropriate authorities, even though it may not target U.S.
persons without a nexus to terrorism, foreign intelligence, or international narcotic trafficking.
The Defense Science Board also saw this as an area in which DoD could expand its efforts beyond analysis and information sharing for an integrated homeland security effort. 57 In many ways, the increased use of DoD assets makes fiscal sense as DoD intelligence controls 80% of the federal intelligence budget. 58 The key to increased use of DoD intelligence in support of homeland security will be what information can be collected and how it can be used and maintained.
The changing nature of the threat also changed the capabilities of DoD intelligence to include collection and identification of threats in the domestic sphere, the DoD intelligence collection nexus, and whether the time constraint of DoD R 5240-1R is relevant against terrorist targets. While traditional foreign intelligence still exists, the threat of foreign cyber attacks "will allow some adversaries to locate and attack targets both overseas and in the United States." 59 This raises the question of how to determine how much information can be collected for computer network defense on individuals who attack networks, if no connection to a foreign threat can be established. Further, determining the characteristics of a cyber attacker could be considered either an offensive intelligence collection activity or a defensive activity for force protection. These questions are not clarified under current policy.
Next, due to the requirement of the EO, a link to a foreign threat is required before DoD intelligence assets can be used. Although a good prevention technique for unwarranted collection, it also serves to deter follow through. Lastly, the time limitation of 90 days in DoDR 5240-1R 60 for material that cannot be linked to a foreign nexus does not reflect that terrorist threats build slowly over time, and errant data points may help build the pattern for future attacks. Defense intelligence assets can adapt to collect on the changing capabilities of threats to the homeland, but guidelines must also adapt to reflect these changes.
BYPASSING EO12333/DOD 5240-1R IMPLEMENTATION AND RISKS THEREIN
The efforts in the federal government since September 11, 2001 , raise the question of whether EO 12333 and DoD 5240-1R requirements have been subsumed within the requirement for homeland security. Defense efforts to address its homeland security mission through the combatant command, NORTHCOM, may place the command in a position that limits its ability to prosecute its mission fully unless it bypasses the provisions of DoD 5240-1R.
To execute the intelligence mission for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense within the most of the United States, NORTHCOM's challenge is to ensure its J2 (intelligence) section conducts operations and collects information while remaining in compliance with the regulation.
NORTHCOM J2 clearly has a responsibility for the homeland defense mission to collect and retain foreign intelligence information that it may receive. However, for homeland security, WORD COUNT=5099
